Oakland Ceasefire Evaluation:
Key Impact Evaluation Findings

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# Focused Deterrence Strategies

- <u>Partnership</u> between criminal justice, social service, and community groups

- <u>Problem analysis</u> to understand underlying crime dynamics
  - Concentration in high-risk groups
- Creative enforcement focused on <u>changing behavior</u>
  - Swiftness, certainty of sanctions for very specific behavior (getting deterrence "right")
  - Only as harsh as needed
  - Not a deal, not a gang/group elimination strategy

- Partners <u>communicate directly</u> to offenders
  - Moral engagement, legitimacy
  - Pairing information of sanction with offers of help and assistance
  - Change <u>norms</u> and <u>decisions</u> made by offenders
  - Credibility, deliver on promises

Systematic Review of Focused Deterrence
Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan (2018), *Criminology and Public Policy*

- Review identified 24 rigorous evaluations with control groups

- Overall, focused deterrence programs were associated with moderate crime reductions

- Group Violence Reduction Strategies were associated with larger crime reductions.

THE CAMPBELL COLLABORATION

Mean Effect Sizes for Study Outcomes

Study name	Outcome	Std diff in means	Standard error	p-Value
Lowell PSN	Gun assaults	1.186	0.207	0.000
Indianapolis VRS	Total homicides	1.039	0.283	0.000
NH Longevity	Combined	0.936	0.324	0.004
Nashville DMI	Combined	0.838	0.320	0.009
Stockton, CA	Gun homicides	0.763	0.157	0.000
Rochester Ceasefire	Combined	0.675	0.298	0.023
NOLA GVRS	Combined	0.656	0.283	0.020
Boston Ceasefire I	Combined	0.645	0.241	0.008
KC NoVA	Combined	0.607	0.322	0.060
LA Ceasefire	Combined	0.565	0.351	0.108
Rockford DMI	Combined	0.521	0.285	0.067
Boston Ceasefire II	Combined	0.503	0.068	0.000
Chicago GVRS	Total gang shootings	0.414	0.157	0.008
Cincinnati IRV	GMI homicides	0.352	0.224	0.115
Glasgow CIRV	Combined	0.298	0.133	0.025
Guntersville DMI	Combined	0.248	0.225	0.272
High Point DMI	Combined	0.243	0.126	0.054
Newark Ceasefire	Gun shot wounds	0.225	0.160	0.159
Chicago PSN	Combined	0.181	0.061	0.003
Roanoke DMI	Combined	0.079	0.082	0.331
Seattle DMI	All crime	0.074	0.035	0.032
Peoria DMI	Combined	0.037	0.300	0.901
Ocala DMI	All crime	-0.001	0.055	0.985
Montgomery DMI	All crime	-0.051	0.116	0.661
		0.383	0.061	0.000

Std diff in means and 95% CI

-2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00

Favors Control   Favors Treatment

Random Effects Model, Q =122.568, df = 23, p<0.000

Combined Mean ES = .383   GVRS Mean ES = .657

Oakland Ceasefire

- In 2012, City of Oakland partnered with CPSC to design and implement Ceasefire intervention.

- Problem analysis revealed that gun violence was driven by small number of chronic offenders involved in gangs/groups.
  - 1% of city involved in 2/3rds gun homicides in 2012.

- OPD led criminal justice partnership, and weekly shooting reviews.

- Broader Ceasefire Partnership included Oakland Unite social service agencies and community leaders.

- Ceasefire goals included:
  - Reduce gang/group related shootings and homicides
  - Reduce the recidivism rate amongst participants
  - Build community-police trust

- Mayor's Office institutionalized program via bi-weekly coordination meetings / bi-monthly performance appraisals.

- Oakland Ceasefire fully implemented in early 2013.
  - Enforcement actions, social service provision, community mobilization
  - Call-ins, custom notifications

Oakland Ceasefire Evaluation

- Collaboration between Northeastern University (Braga, Greg Zimmerman), Northwestern University (Andrew Papachristos), and Rutgers University (Brunson)

- 4 Key Components / Goals:

  - Place-Based Impact Assessment   (COMPLETED)
    - Was Oakland Ceasefire associated with citywide reductions?
    - Did Oakland neighborhoods where Ceasefire was implemented experience reductions?

  - Gang / Group Impact Assessment   (COMPLETED)
    - Did Ceasefire reduce the shooting behaviors of Oakland gangs /groups?

  - Individual Impact Assessment   (IN PROCESS)
    - Did Ceasefire reduce recidivism by participants?
    - Did Ceasefire reduce violent victimization of participants?

  - Community / Service Partner Agencies Perceptions   (COMPLETED)
    - Did Ceasefire improve neighborhood safety?
    - Did Ceasefire improve community-police trust?

- Evaluation was focused on gun homicides and non-fatal shootings
  - Total homicides and non-fatal shootings also analyzed in place-based impact assessment

Oakland Fatal and Non-Fatal Shootings, 2010 - 2017

52.1% reduction in fatal and non-fatal shootings between 2011 and 2017.

Place-Based Impact Assessment

- Cross-city quasi-experimental design
  - 12 comparison cities: Fresno, Sacramento, Stockton, Santa Ana, Anaheim, Long Beach, Riverside, Bakersfield, Alameda, San Francisco, Richmond, East Palo Alto
  - Monthly counts of gun homicides (Poisson, negative binomial), 2010-2017
  - Interrupted time series analyses controlling for population trends, violent crime trends, linear and non-linear trends, and seasonal effects

- Within-Oakland quasi-experimental design
  - Block groups were units of analysis (24.9%, 93 of 311 w/treated gang/group turf)
  - Monthly counts of fatal and non-fatal shootings, 2010-2017
  - Propensity score matching based on prior violence, N gangs/groups, neighborhood disadvantage, resident race/ethnicity, gentrification (47 treated, 95 comparison)
  - Differences-in-differences estimator (DID), growth curve regression models
  - Spillover effect analysis for adjacent block groups

Monthly Counts of Gun Homicides in Oakland, 2010 - 2017

Ceasefire Implementation

Number of Gun Homicides

— Monthly Count of Gun Homicides — Pre-test Mean = 7.81 — Post-test Mean = 6.15

CROSS-CITY RESULTS

Estimated 31.5% reduction controlling for other trends and seasonal variations ($p<.05$).

Only 2 of 12 comparison cities experienced significant reductions during this time period (Stockton, San Francisco).

Monthly Counts of Shootings in Matched Treated and Untreated Block Groups in Oakland, 2010 - 2017

Ceasefire Implementation

Mean Shootings + Homicides per Block Group

| Matched Ceasefire Block Groups (n = 47) | Matched Comparison Block Groups (n = 95) |

WITHIN OAKLAND RESULTS

Estimated 20.0% reduction in shootings in treated BGs relative to comparison BGs ($p<.05$).

Non-significant 18.0% reduction in shootings in areas surrounding treated BGs relative to areas surrounding untreated block groups.

Gang / Group Impact Assessment

- Quasi-experimental design
  - Gangs / groups were units of analysis (76 active groups between 2010-2017)
  - 15 gangs / groups were directly treated by Ceasefire intervention
  - Social network analysis revealed 13 gang / groups connected to treated gang/groups through conflicts and alliances (vicarious treatment)
  - Monthly counts of fatal and non-fatal shootings, 2010-2017
  - Propensity score matching based on prior violence, gang / group size, conflicts / alliances, longevity, housing project location (13 directly treated, 9 vicariously treated, 36 untreated gangs / groups)
  - Differences-in-differences estimator (DID), growth curve regression models
  - Spillover effect analysis for socially-connected gangs / groups

Direct and Vicarious Ceasefire Treatment Applied to Oakland Gangs / Groups

KEY

= Ceasefire Direct
= Ceasefire Vicarious
= Conflict
= Alliance

Oakland Gang/Group-Member-Involved and Non-Gang/Group-Member-Involved Shootings, 2010-2017

Oakland Ceasefire Implemented

Gang/group shootings: 342, 367, 329, 269, 211, 188, 170, 145

Non-gang/gang shootings: 263, 343, 338, 285, 278, 233, 218, 195

GMI V. NON-GMI TRENDS

Decrease in gang/group-member-involved shootings was steeper than the decrease in non-gang/group-member-involved shootings after Ceasefire implemented.

GMI shootings decreased by 43.2% while non-GMI shootings decreased by only 23.2%.

QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Estimated 27.0% reduction in shootings by treated gangs relative to untreated gangs ($p<.05$).

Estimated 26.0% reduction in shootings by vicariously-treated gangs relative to untreated gangs ($p<.05$).

Individual Impact Assessment

Oakland Co-Arrest Network, 2010-2017

- Red nodes represent Ceasefire participants

- Key outcome measures
  - Violent recidivism
  - Violent victimization

- Analysis of individual "spillover" effects

- Analysis of compliance and treatment dosage

Community / Service Partner Perceptions

- The project involved qualitative, in-depth interviews with: Ceasefire call-in clients, City, clergy, community leaders, and social service providers. Police and probation officers were also interviewed.

- Study participants were recruited with the assistance of the Oakland-based study partners.

- All interviews were voluntary, conducted in private offices, and respondents were promised strict confidentiality.

- The research team read transcripts in their entirety before engaging in systematic, coding and data analysis.

Results – Partner Perceptions
Goal 1: Reduce gang/group related shootings and homicides

- There was strong consensus among study participants that Ceasefire greatly enhanced the City's capacity to systematically and thoughtfully reduce shootings and homicides.

- Respondents uniformly agree that a few "bad actors" are disproportionately responsible for serious violence in Oakland.

- While celebrating the observed decreases, individuals living and providing services in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods were emphatic that too much violence persists.

Results – Partner Perceptions
Goal 2: Reduce the recidivism rate amongst participants

- Even study participants who were highly supportive of the intervention expressed considerable confusion about the accuracy and integrity of call-in lists.

- Respondents reported being troubled that call-ins were not always conducted in a respectful manner, potentially deepening clients' distrust of the police and overall criminal justice system.

Results – Partner Perceptions
Goal 3: Build community-police trust

- Although the majority of respondents readily acknowledged that police-community relations had steadily improved since 2012, almost everyone interviewed mentioned the widely publicized sex scandal involving OPD officers as a devastating setback that continues to undermine citizen trust.

- Study participants stressed that positive police-community relations were not merely about officers not shooting unarmed persons but required that rank-and-file officers treat citizens with dignity and respect during routine encounters.

Results – Partner Perceptions (cont'd)
Goal 3: Build community-police trust

- Respondents expressed great support for dedicating law enforcement and social service resources to the small number of individuals at highest risk for violence (both as perpetrators and victims).

- Study participants embrace Ceasefire over indiscriminate and heavy-handed policing initiatives that have the potential to criminalize entire communities.

- The vast majority of respondents applauded City leaders for their unwavering commitment to Ceasefire, noting that the current political support is unprecedented.

Recommendations

- Increased involvement of call-in clients' romantic partners, friends, and family members in the hope of reducing program stigma and strengthening community support.

- Implement a more inclusive communications strategy aimed at the general public, highlighting law enforcement and social service delivery achievements.

Conclusions

- Ceasefire was associated with a 32% reduction in citywide shootings that seemed distinct from trends in most other California cities.

- Ceasefire generated a 20% reduction in shootings in neighborhoods that experienced the program relative to neighborhoods that did not experience the program. No evidence that violence was pushed into surrounding neighborhoods.

- Ceasefire generated a 27% reduction in shootings by gangs / groups directly experiencing the program as well as gangs /groups socially-connected to treated gangs / groups.

- Community and social service interview subjects felt that Ceasefire improved neighborhood safety BUT there was still much more work to do to improve community-police relations.